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CONTRACTS-The Supreme Court Speaks Where The
Legislature Was Silent: Torrance County Mental Health
Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Environment
Department
I. INTRODUCTION
In Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico
Health & Environment Department,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
ruled, on public policy grounds, that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive
damages in a breach-of-contract claim against the state. 2 Striking down
the hefty $1.5 million punitive damages award in this case of first
impression, the unanimous supreme court settled a question of law that
stemmed from a disparity between two governmental immunity statutes.
With an express statutory prohibition against tort-based punitive damages
already in place, 3 this case likely represents the last word on the question
of whether punitive damages can be recovered from the state. This article
examines the propriety of punitive damages in a suit for breach of contract
against the state.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. ("Torrance"), initiated an action in 1982 against the New Mexico Health and
Environment Department ("HED") and three of its employees. Torrance
provided community mental health counseling services for the state from
July, 1978, until the termination of its contract in December of 1981.
.According to Torrance's version of the facts, 4 Torrance had been the
victim of a conspiracy between HED officials and an ambitious Torrance
employee named Vigil. Torrance alleged that, pursuant to a secret agreement with Vigil, HED officials staged a phoney inspection. This inspection,
the validity of which was hotly contested at trial, disclosed "serious
misuse of funds" by Torrance's directors. HED terminated the contract
pursuant to a contract provision that permitted rescission for misuse of
funds. Shortly thereafter, HED awarded the contract to a rival corporation, Valencia Counseling Services, that had been quickly formed by
Vigil.5 Valencia Counseling Services continues to provide mental health
services in Torrance and Valencia Counties to the present day.
Alleging that it had received a prearranged "hatchet job" from HED,
Torrance and its former employees filed suit against HED and three of
its officers. The initial complaint included claims under theories of breach
1. 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (1992).
2. Id. at 601, 830 P.2d at 153.
3. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
4. For the purposes of the appeal, the court viewed the plaintiff's version of the facts "in the
Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 594, 830
light most favorable to support the jury's verdict ...
P.2d at 146.
5. Id. at 595. 830 P.2d at 147.
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of contract, civil rights violations, and fraud. By the time the case actually
came to trial in 1990, Torrance remained as the sole plaintiff, and the
breach of contract claim remained as the sole cause of action. A pretrial
so that, going
order dismissed the claims against individual defendants
6
defendant.
only
the
as
remained
HED
into trial,
On the first day of trial, Torrance sought to amend the pretrial order
to permit a claim for punitive damages "of approximately $100,000."
Torrance maintained that its earlier omission of the punitive damages
claim had been the result of an oversight on the part of its former
7
counsel. The trial court acceded and amended the pretrial order.
After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff
for $1.77 million compensatory and punitive damages. The compensatory
damages consisted of awards of $27,000 for employee expenses and
$250,000 for loss of corporate value; the judgment also included $1.5
million in punitive damages. On appeal, HED sought to overturn the
decision on three grounds: 1) the trial court erred when it amended the
pretrial order and permitted the punitive damages claim; 2) there was
insufficient evidence to support the award of compensatory damages; and
3) the award of punitive damages is improper in a breach of contract
claim against the state. The New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association ("Trial
Lawyers") submitted an amicus brief urging affirmance of the punitive
damages award.'
In an opinion authored by Justice Montgomery, the New Mexico
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed
the trial court's award of $27,000 to compensate former employees for
out-of-pocket costs occasioned by HED's breach. The supreme court
struck down an award of $250,000 which the trial court awarded for
Torrance's loss of corporate value on the grounds that this award was
"completely unsupported." Finally, the court reversed the award of $1.5
million punitive damages after holding that public policy did not permit
such an award. 9
III.

HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

On appeal, both plaintiff and defendant relied heavily on statutory
construction and legislative intent arguments. The court, however, was
not particularly persuaded by either interpretation of history and instead
resolved the case on policy grounds.10 Nonetheless, an understanding of
the historical development of both sovereign immunity and punitive damages in New Mexico is essential to an analysis of the arguments.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 595-96, 830 P.2d at 147-48.
Id. at 595, 830 P.2d at 147.
Id. at 596-97, 830 P.2d at 148-49.
Id. at 601-04, 830 P.2d at 153-56.
Id. at 599, 830 P.2d at 151.
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Governmental Immunity in New Mexico
The New Mexico territorial legislature adopted sovereign immunity
when, in an 1876 statute, it received "the common law as recognize in
" Sovereign immunity had its roots in the methe United States ....
dieval belief in the infallibility of tl~e sovereign.' 2 Common law sovereign
immunity did not apply different rules to different causes of action. All
claims against the state, whether based in tort, contract, or unjust enrichment, were invalid in the absence of an express statute authorizing
such a claim."
Prior to the supreme court's abolition of common law sovereign immunity in Hicks v. State 4 in 1975, the legislature enacted several specific
waivers to the doctrine. The first waiver, a 1941 statute, permitted state
5
liability for automobile accidents involving government employees. Between 1941 and 1975, the legislature passed several other limited immunity

A.

waivers.'

6

A 1963 law waived sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims
against the state.' 7 Entitled "An Act Relinquishing the Sovereign Immunity
of the State in Actions Based on Written Contracts," this law provided
that "[a]ctions not otherwise provided by law may be maintained and
any judgment enforced against the state and any of its agencies when
based on a written contract."" During the thirteen-year period that the
1963 law remained on the statute books, the question of whether it
authorized punitive damages never arose. Pre-Hicks sovereign immunity
prohibited government liability for punitive damages "in the absence of
a statute so authorizing.' 9
In a 1975 decision, Hicks v. State,20 the New Mexico Supreme Court
followed the lead of several other states and abolished common law
sovereign immunity. 2' Two years earlier, the supreme court had foreshadowed this development by warning that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was "headed for a deserved repose.' '22 Whether Hicks abolished
sovereign immunity in all its forms or merely for tort actions was not
entirely clear from the Hicks opinion. Although the Torrance County
court adopted Torrance's position that Hicks had abolished sovereign
immunity "in all its ramifications," the Hicks opinion itself had certainly

11. 1875-1876 N.M. Laws, ch. 2, § 2 (codified as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-3).
12. Jamie McAlister, Note, The New Mexico Tort Claims Act: The King Can Do "Little"
Wrong, 21 N.M. L. Rv.441, 442 (1991).
13. See id. at 442.
14. 88 N.M. 588, 590, 544 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1975).
15. Ruth L. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M. L.
Rav. 249, 252 (1976).
16. Id.
17. 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 152 (codified as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23-1 (1953)).
18. Id.
19. Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 311, 243 P.2d 609, 618 (1952).
20. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
21. Id. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155-57. Hicks involved a wrongful death tort claim in which the
plaintiff asserted that the state had negligently maintained a public bridge.
22. City of Albuquerque v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 776, 778, 508 P.2d 585, 587 (1973).
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left ample room for the argument that it abolished sovereign immunity

only for tort claims .23

The Hicks court recognized that it "would work an . . . injustice to
deny defendant and other units of government a defense on which they
have a right to rely.'"' Accordingly, the supreme court ordered that the
abolition of sovereign immunity would be effective only for torts occurring
after July 1, 1976.25 The supreme court provided this respite to permit
the legislature to take measures to protect the state from liability. 26 The
New Mexico legislature quickly seized this opportunity and passed the
Tort Claims Act, which became effective on July 1, 1976.27 This act
reinstated governmental immunity from suit and enumerated a number
of specific exceptions to this immunity." The Tort Claims Act specifically
prohibited the recovery of punitive damages from the state: "No judgment
against a governmental entity or public employee for any tort for which
immunity has been waived under the Tort Claims Act shall include an
award for exemplary or punitive damages or for interest prior to
judgment. '29 As its name implies, the Tort Claims Act addressed only
tort claims."'
Prior to the Hicks decision, the waiver of common law sovereign
immunity required affirmative legislative action . 3a After Hicks, immunity
32
would only exist when it was specifically imposed by the legislature.
This alteration in the fundamental theory underlying governmental immunity mandated a new legislative approach.33 Accordingly, the same
legislature that enacted the Tort Claims Act also repealed the 1963 statute
which authorized contract claims against the state. 34 In its place, the
legislature enacted a statute that accomplished the same end with different
language. While the old law had "Relinquish[ed the] Sovereign Immunity
of the State in Actions Based on Written Contracts," the new law "granted
23. In what appeared to be the holding in Hicks, the court stated that "[c]ommon law sovereign
immunity may no longer be interposed as a defense by the State, or any of its political subdivisions,
in tort actions." Hicks, 88 N.M. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155 (emphasis added). In contrast, another
passage in the same paragraph did not confine its criticism to tort-based sovereign immunity:
"[Sovereign immunity] can no longer be justified by existing circumstances and has long been devoid
of any valid justification." Id. HED took the position that Hicks' abolition of sovereign immunity
was limited to tort-based actions and left undisturbed the state's sovereign immunity from contract
based claims. Appellant's Reply Brief at 16, Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New
Mexico Health & Environment Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (1992) (No. 19-272). HED's
position failed to take into consideration the reasoning of Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 110
N.M. 173, 177, 793 P.2d 855, 859 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
24. Hicks, 88 N.M. at 594, 544 P.2d at 1159 (quoting Spaniel v. Mounds View School, 118
N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962)).
25. Id. at 593, 544 P.2d at 1158.
26. Id. at 594, 544 P.2d at 1159.
27. Id.
28. 1976 N.M. Laws, ch. 58, §§ 1 to 31 (codified as N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -19 (Repl.
Pamp. 1989)).
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
30. Id. § 41-4-4.
31. See Hicks, 88 N.M. at 589, 544 P.2d at 1154.
32. See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 597, 830 P.2d at 149.
33. See Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 110 N.M. 173, 177, 793 P.2d 855, 859 (1990).
34. See id.
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immunity from actions35 based on contract," and then waived this immunity
for written contracts.
Unlike the Tort Claims Act, the 1976 contract claims statute was silent
on the issue of punitive damages. 36 The supreme court was unable to
37
discern from this silence any legislative intent "one way or the other.
Thus, in ruling on the propriety of punitive damages against the state,
the Torrance County court had to decide what significance,
if any, to
38
attribute to the disparity between these two statutes.
B.

Punitive Damages
New Mexico courts have permitted recovery of contract-based punitive
damages since the 1940 case of Stewart v. Potter.39 The Stewart court
said that "[s]uch damages are allowable where the wrong is aggravated,
wanton, or maliciously intentional." 4 This standard has remained consistent during the half century that has elapsed since Stewart.4 ' Although
many jurisdictions require that the defendant's breach of contract must
constitute an independent tort in order for punitive damages to be proper,
New Mexico has declined to adopt this requirement. 42
There are at least two published pre-Hicks New Mexico cases which
involve punitive damage claims against governmental entities 3 The courts
disposed of both of these cases on sovereign immunity grounds. 44 Until
Torrance County, a published New Mexico appellate opinion has not
addressed the propriety of recovering punitive damages from a governmental entity under post-Hicks law.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Both Torrance and the Trial Lawyers relied heavily upon statutory
construction arguments to support the contention that the legislature
intended to permit recovery of punitive damages in contract-based claims
against the state. 45 These arguments focused upon the fact that the 1976
post-Hicks contract claims statute made no mention of punitive damages. 46
This law stands in marked contrast to the 1976 Tort Claims Act which

35. See id.
36. See 1976 N.M. Laws, ch. 58, § 24 (codified as N.M.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp.

1990)).

37. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.

38. Id.
39. 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940).
40. Id. at 464, 104 P.2d at 740.
41. See, e.g., Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 784 P.2d 992 (1989); Hood v. Fulkerson,
102 N.M. 677, 699 P.2d 608 (1985).
42. See Romero, 109 N.M. at 257, 784 P.2d at 1000.
43. Rascoe v. Town of Farmington, 62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575 (1956); Brown v. Village of
Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952).
44. See Rascoe, 62 N.M. at 55, 304 P.2d at 577; see also Brown, 56 N.M. at 316, 243 P.2d
at 616-17.
45. See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 597-99, 830 P.2d at 149-51.
46. Id.
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specifically prohibits punitive damages in tort-based actions. 47 Torrance
theorized that by silence, the legislature expressed its intent to permit
punitive damages in contract claims. HED's counter-argument was that
the Tort Claims Act's prohibition served to immunize the state 49from
punitive damages completely, regardless of the form of the claim.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that, in applying a
statute, its primary goal is to uphold legislative intent.5 0 In determining
legislative intent, the court looks primarily to the plain language of the
statute: "When the words of the statute are free from ambiguity and
doubt, resort should not be undertaken to any other means of interIf the statute's meaning is not apparent from the text, the
pretation.'
52
court may consider the historical context of the statute's enactment.
Although New Mexico courts refuse to read into a statute that which is
not there, they have been willing to "read the act in its entirety and
construe each part in connection with every other part to produce a
harmonious whole." 5 3 Applying these principles of statutory construction,
the Torrance County court was unable to discern any legislative intent
to permit punitive damages in contract claims against the state.54 Instead,
the court recognized the desirability of construing the two statutes to
achieve a harmonious result:
What sense would it make to have one rule disallowing punitive
damages for say, malicious conduct in committing a tort, and the
opposite rule for the same or similar conduct in breaching a contract?
We think that such a juxtaposition of the operative legal rule would
be nonsensical, and we decline the invitation to adopt it."
Disposing of Torrance's legislative silence argument, the Torrance County
court said:
[O]ur legislature's silence on punitive damages in Section 37-1-23
cannot be read as expressing an intention to waive immunity for
punitive damages in contract actions, even though in the same act
(1976 N.M. Laws, Chapter 58 (2d Session)) the legislature, dealing
with the major subject of the legislation (tort claims against the state),
56
expressly granted immunity for punitive damages in tort cases.
The court did not see a need to account for or explain the disparity
between the two statutes: "We find no intent one way or the other on

47. Id. at 597, 830 P.2d at 149.
48. Id. at 597-98, 830 P.2d at 149-50.
49. Brief-in-Chief for Appellant at 31, Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New
Mexico Health & Environment Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (1992) (No. 19-272).
50. See First Nat'l Bank of Santa Fe v. Southwest Yacht & Marine Supply Corp., 101 N.M.
431, 435, 684 P.2d 517, 521 (1984).
51. State ex rel.Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Schools, 111 N.M. 495, 500, 806 P.2d 1085, 1090
(Ct. App. 1991).
52. See State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988).
53. Id.
54. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
55. Id. at 601, 830 P.2d at 153.
56. Id.at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
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the subject of punitive damages in contract actions. Whether by legislative
oversight or 5otherwise,
the legislature simply failed to express its will on
7
the subject.
Even if the Torrance County court had attempted to divine meaning
from the legislature's silence, it is doubtful that the court would have
adopted Torrance's legislative silence theory. If one assumes arguendo
that the New Mexico legislature's silence did reflect an intention to permit
punitive damages in contract claims against the state, one faces two
difficult questions: 1) Why would the legislature want to permit punitive
damages for contract-based claims, but not for tort-based claims? and
2) Why did the legislature not explicitly state its intention?
In their appellate briefs, both Torrance and the Trial Lawyers argued
that punitive damages would promote important social policies by deterring
government officials from malicious conduct.5 8 Yet, neither brief attempted
to explain why, if the legislature intended to deter state agents from
maliciously breaching contracts, the legislature refused to provide the
same safeguard against malicious torts. Furthermore, neither brief attempted to explain why the legislature failed to state this intent explicitly.
The absence of a credible rationale renders Torrance's legislative silence
theory untenable.
The Torrance County court did not attempt to account for the disparity
between the tort and contract claim statutes, except to say that the
difference may have been the result of "legislative drafting or oversight." 5 9
An examination of the position occupied by punitive damages in the law
of contracts supports the inference that the difference between the two
statutes was merely the result of legislative oversight. In virtually all
United States jurisdictions, punitive damage claims are far more prevalent
in tort cases than in contract cases.60 In Romero v. Mervyn's, 6' the
supreme court expounded New Mexico's law of punitive damages in
contract cases. The court held that punitive damages are appropriate
when the breach of contract is accompanied by "malicious, fraudulent,
oppressive, or . . . reckless[]" conduct. 62 In dicta, however, the Romero
court also recognized that punitive damages are the exception rather than
the rule in contract cases: "Notwithstanding the general exclusion of
punitive damages from contract cases, however, exceptions long have

been recognized. "63
Most treatise writers agree that punitive damages are exceptional in
contract law. 4 It is reasonable to assume that the drafters of the 1976
57. Id.
58. See Brief for Appellee at 46-52, and Brief of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association,
Amicus Curiae, at 18-25, Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health &
Environment Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (1992) (No. 19-272).
59. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
60. See DAN B. DOaBS, HANDBOOK ON Tm LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.4, at 818 (1973); see also
Stephanie E. Pochop, Note, Hoffman v. Louis Dreyfus Corp.: Punitive Damages on the Borderland
of Tort and Contract, 35 S.D. L. REv. 118, 124 (1990).
61. 109 N.M. 249, 784 P.2d 992 (1989).
62. Id. at 255, 784 P.2d at 998.
63. Id. at 257, 784 P.2d at 1000 (emphasis added).
64. See DoBas, supra note 61, § 12.4, at 818; 5 ARTRuR L. CotrN, CoaBIN ON CONTRACTS §
1077, at 438-39 (1964).
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contract claims statute were cognizant of this "general exclusion.' '65 If

these drafters had desired to go against the grain of a widespread legal
norm, by permitting punitives in contract while denying them in tort, it
seems that the drafters would have explicitly stated this intent. But, as
the Torrance County court pointed out, it is unlikely that the drafters
intended such a result." A more plausible explanation is that the drafters
of the contract claims statute, if they considered the matter, saw no need
generally excluded in the contract law
to exclude that which was already
67
of New Mexico and the nation.

As an alternative to the legislative intent argument, Torrance and the
Trial Lawyers argued that Hicks's sweeping abolition of sovereign68 immunity in all its forms left in its aftermath only the common law.

The

common law, as recognized in New Mexico, permits recovery of punitive
damages in breach of contract claims. 69 Torrance and the Trial Lawyers
argued that therefore, after Hicks, the common law doctrine which permits
by the legislature, equally
punitive damages in contract cases, 7unmodified
0
applies to claims against the state.

In contrast, HED adopted the position that the Hicks decision's abolition of sovereign immunity applied only to tort claims. 7' The uncertain
language of the Hicks opinion left room for HED's argument that Hicks
72
did not abolish the state's sovereign immunity to contract claims. Nev-

ertheless, in a 1990 case, Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble,73 the supreme
court cleared up this ambiguity and ruled that Hicks' abolition of sovereign
immunity applied to actions based in contract and quasi-contract as well
as tort.7 4 Thus, HED's position that sovereign immunity from contract
claims remained intact after Hicks is irreconcilable with the Hydro Conduit
decision.7

Taking the same position that it had taken in the Hydro Conduit
decision, the supreme court agreed with Torrance that Hicks "generally
abolished the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in all its
ramifications, whether in tort or contract or otherwise, except as implemented by statute ...."76 Nonetheless, the supreme court refused to be
bound by a "common law mandate that the state may be assessed punitive
65. Cf. New Mexico ex rel. Bird v. State, 91 N.M. 279, 284, 573 P.2d 213, 218 (1978) (legislature
presumed to know existing common law).
66. See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
67. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
68. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
69. Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 255, 784 P.2d 992, 998 (1989).
70. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
71. Appellant's Reply Brief at 16, Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico
Health & Environment Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (1992) (No. 19-272).
72. See supra note 24.
73. 110 N.M. 173, 793 P.2d 855 (1990).
74. Id. at 173-74, 793 P.2d at 859-60. The Hydro Conduit court ruled that, although the Hicks
opinion's abolition of sovereign immunity applied to quasi-contract, the contract claims statute,
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990), effectively prohibits quasi-contract claims against
the state. Section 37-1-23 provides that the state shall only be liable for written contracts. Quasicontracts are, by definition, implied and not written. Hence, a quasi-contract claim will not lie
against the state.
75. See supra note 24.
76. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 597, 830 P.2d at 149.
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damages in contract actions." ' 77 Instead, the supreme court adopted the
position that the legislature's silence left the issue "open for decision by
this Court, applying what we believe to be the relevant policy considerations ..
V.

POLICY

In language that was reminiscent of such landmark cases as Scott v.
Rizzo 79 and Lopez v. Maez, 80 the supreme court asserted its authority to
shape the common law on the basis of policy in the absence of legislative
action." The court stated that "[riesolution of that [punitive damages]
issue is not dictated by anything the legislature has said, nor by any
judicial precedents decided before or after our decision in Hicks. ' 82 After
setting this stage, the court went on to discuss what it saw as the relevant
policy issues.83
The Torrance County court acknowledged that Torrance had raised a
persuasive policy argument in favor of permitting punitive damages8
The court agreed that punitive damages would provide a strong disincentive
against the abuse of government power and 'send a message' to the
legislature. ' 85 Nonetheless, the court determined that the public policy
of deterrence was subordinate to two overriding policy considerations:
1) the irrationality
of punishing taxpayers; and 2) the need to conserve
86
tax dollars.
A.

Punishment
The Torrance County court recognized that because punitive damages
serve to punish the wrongdoer, an award of punitive damages against
the state is, in effect, punishment of the taxpayers.8 7 The court adopted
the reasoning that the United States Supreme Court used when it rejected
an award of punitive damages against a municipality in City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, Inc.: 8
Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the
injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful
action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from
similar extreme conduct .... Regarding retribution, it remains true
that an award of punitive damages against a municipality 'punishes'

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 598, 830 P.2d at 150.
Id.
96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (judicial adoption of comparative negligence).
98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (judicial imposition of dram shop liability).
See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 599, 830 P.2d at 151.
Id.
Id. at 599-601, 830 P.2d at 151-53.
Id. at 599, 830 P.2d at 151.
Id.
Id. at 600, 830 P.2d at 152.
Id.
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort. 89

A large number of jurisdictions have adopted positions virtually identical
to that taken by the City of Newport Court. 90

That the imposition of punitive damages upon government entities

irrationally punishes innocent taxpayers is a widespread criticism. 91 None-

theless, one can make the same criticism of the state's liability for
compensatory damages. In its appellate brief, Torrance pointed out that
"[the] argument that the taxpayers will ultimately pay punitive damages
is equally applicable to compensatory damages against the state ... "92

In New Mexico, as in most states, governmental entities can be liable93
for compensatory damages in certain types of tort and contract actions.
When a court holds the state liable for compensatory damages as a result

of the act of a government agent, the innocent taxpayer bears the burden
just as he would if the state paid punitive damages.
Whether the distinction between punitive and compensatory damages
claims is valid may depend upon the proper function of these two different
remedies. Under the law of New Mexico, the stated purposes of punitive

damages are punishment and deterrence. 94 Arguably, punishment and

deterrence are indistinct and punishment is merely the means by which
deterrence is achieved. The court of appeals adopted this position in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maidment95 when it
said that "Itihe deterrent effect of punitive damages on others, however,
is inextricably tied to the punishment of the tort-feasor. If the tort-feasor
'96
cannot be punished, it follows that there can be no general deterrence.
New Mexico courts have held that, in contract law, compensatory
damages function primarily to compensate the plaintiff for the loss caused

89. Id. at 267. The City of Newport Court pointed out that holding the government official
personally liable for punitive damages would best serve the aims of deterrence and punishment. Id.
at 269. This is not a viable alternative under New Mexico law, however, because the Tort Claims
Act prohibits the assessment of punitive damages against the government agent who commits a tort
while acting within the scope of his employment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4 to -19 (Repl.
Pamp. 1989). In contrast, the New Mexico contract claims statute does not immunize a government
official from liability. Id. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). Nonetheless, a breach of contract suit will
not lie against a public employee when the employee's conduct is the cause of the state's breach
because the official is not a party to the contract. Furthermore, the Tort Claims Act will not permit
a suit against the government agent (individually) for the tort of interference with contractual
relations if the agent was acting within the scope of his official duties. See id. §§ 41-4-1 to -19.
90. See, e.g., Fisher v. Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Gary v. Falcone, 348 N.E.2d 41
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339 (Me. 1973); Chappell v.
Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968); Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 437 N.E.2d 1104 (N.Y. 1982);
Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 321 N.E.2d 885 (Ohio 1975); Nixon v. Oklahoma, 555 P.2d 1283
(Okla. 1976). But see Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd
400 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (applying Pennsylvania law); Young
v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978), overruled by Parks v. City of Marshalltown,
440 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1989).
91. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
92. Brief for Appellee at 50, Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico
Health & Environment Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (1992) (No. 19-272).
93. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
94. N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1827.
95. 107 N.M. 568, 761 P.2d 446 (Ct. App. 1988).
96. Id. at 570, 761 P.2d at 449.
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by the defendant's breach.9 Thus, the different goals between compensatory and punitive damages (compensation vs. deterrence) may provide
a theoretical basis for the disparate treatment given these two remedies.
In contrast, Judge Posner, the foremost Law and Economics theorist,
asserts that the primary function of compensatory damages is not to
compensate for the plaintiff's loss, but to deter uneconomical breaches. 9
If one accepts the premise that deterrence is the objective of both punitive
and compensatory remedies, then there seems to be no theoretical justification for permitting one remedy and denying the other when the
defendant is a government entity.
The rule that a government can be liable for compensatory but not
punitive damages may also be justified on the ground that retribution
is an element of punitive damages. If punishment for punishment's sake
is a goal distinct from deterrence, then the disparate treatment given
compensatory and punitive remedies is defensible. Prosser indicates that
punitive damages include elements of both deterrence and retribution:
In one rather anomalous respect, however, the ideas underlying the
criminal law have invaded the field of torts. Where the defendant's
wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character
of outrage frequently associated with crime, all but a few courts have
permitted the jury to award in the tort action "punitive" or "exemplary" damages .... Such damages are given to the plaintiff over
and above the full compensation for the injuries, for the purpose of
punishing the defendant, of teaching the defendant not to do it again,
and of deterring others from following the defendant's example. 99
Ultimately, the question of whether there is any theoretical basis for
treating punitive and compensatory damage claims differently may hinge
on the question of whether retribution, the expression of society's outrage,
can be the basis for the civil remedy of punitive damages. The debate
which focuses on the question of whether retribution is a legitimate goal
of criminal law'00 seems equally relevant to civil punitive damages. If
retribution, by itself, can support an award of punitive damages, then
the widespread objection to taxpayers paying such damages is theoretically
sound. If, however, deterrence is the only legitimate aim of exemplary
remedies, then the prohibition against government liability for punitive
damages may be a mere line-drawing process by which tax dollars are
safeguarded.' 0 '

97. Allen v. Allen Title Co., 77 N.M. 796, 798, 427 P.2d 673, 675 (1967).
98. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 91 (4th ed. 1992).
99. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984). In contrast to
Professor Prosser, Professor Posner questions the legitimacy of retribution, even as an objective
of criminal law. Rather, Professor Posner argues that deterrence, not retribution, is the legitimate
basis for both civil and criminal sanctions. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECoNoMcs OF JUSTICE
207-27 (1981).
100. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PmLOsOPHY & PUB. ALF. 217 (1973).
101. One could argue that the court has drawn the line in the wrong place. Under the provisions
of the Tort Claims Act, a damage cap limits the state's liability to $300,000 per person per incident.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Thus, there is a viable argument that the legislature
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B.

Conservation of Public Revenues
The Torrance County court identified the need to "protect public
revenues" as the second policy justification for denying the recovery of
punitive damages from government entities:
Revenues for the operation of state and local government programs
are notoriously thin these days, and diversion of those revenues to
punish a recalcitrant or abusive governmental agency may diminish
funds available to carry out other programs that are of equal importance to the chastised program and merit it no reduction in funding
because of another agency's derelictions.' °0
The court saw this need to conserve tax dollars as "especially compelling
given the legislature's determination that public revenues shall not be
diverted to payment of punitive damages in tort cases."' 0 3
One New Mexico court has pointed out that "the need to protect the
public treasuries" is the foremost justification for governmental immunity.'04 Likewise, the high courts in a number of jurisdictions have
recognized that there is a compelling need to limit government liability
and to protect public revenues.'0 5 As the United States Supreme Court
noted, the wealth of governments makes them particularly attractive and
vulnerable:
Because evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is traditionally admissible
as a measure of the amount of punitive damages that should be
awarded, the unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a
prejudicial impact on the jury, in effect encouraging it to impose a
sizable award. The impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be
both unpredictable and, at times, substantial, and we are sensitive to
the possible strain on local treasuries and therefore on services available
to the public at large.106
Proponents of government liability for punitive damages argue that
the danger to public revenues is minimal because judicial scrutiny will
serve as a safeguard against huge, unjustified awards. 107 Even if this is
true, punitive damage claims would likely impose a "strain on local
treasuries" extending beyond the monetary judgment itself. The court of
appeals has pointed out that governmental immunity "enables the gov-

has already drawn the line, and therefore a plaintiff should be able to recover compensatory and
punitive damages totalling $300,000 in a contract-based claim against the state. Of course, the
rejoinder to this argument is that the legislature's decree that punitive damages are not recoverable
in tort actions against the state expresses the legislature's aversion to the concept of state liability
for punitive damages. This is the position which HED argued and which the Torrance County court
adopted. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
102. Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 600, 830 P.2d at 152.
103. Id.
104. See Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 95 N.M. 391, 394, 622 P.2d 699, 702 (Ct. App.
1980); see also Hydro Conduit, 110 N.M. at 173, 793 P.2d at 856.
105. See, e.g., City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 266; Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015,
1027 (Kan. 1976).
106. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 270 (footnotes omitted).
107. See Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 622 (Iowa 1978), overruled by Parks
v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1989).
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ernment and its various subdivisions to function unhampered by the threat
of time and energy consuming legal actions which would inhibit the
administration of traditional state activities."' ' 0 If a state were to permit
the recovery of punitive damages from itself and its subsidiaries, it would
need to defend against potential plaintiffs attempting to get at the "ultimate deep pocket."'19 Longer court dockets and greater legal costs
would impose additional drains on public revenues."10 The potentially
large size and versatility of punitive damage claims would be attractive
to prospective plaintiffs,"' and defense costs would probably burden
governmental entities considerably.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By holding for policy reasons that the state cannot be liable for punitive
damages, the Torrance County court essentially engaged in a line-drawing
process. This legal dichotomy affords a powerful remedy to one plaintiff
while denying it to another plaintiff who has the misfortune of suffering
injury at the hands 2of the state. Some have criticized this as an arbitrary
and unjust result."
In Torrance County, the injured plaintiff argued that punitive damages,
when awarded against the state, would promote important social policies
by deterring public employees from future wrongful conduct., 3 Whether
punishment and deterrence are distinct goals or punishment is merely the
means by which deterrence is achieved, the innocent taxpayer ultimately
bears the cost." 4 Had the Torrance County court affirmed the trial court's
award of punitive damages, the taxpayers would have borne the brunt
of the punitive sanction. The actual wrongdoers would have escaped
punishment, and the fully-compensated plaintiff would have received a
windfall. The supreme court reached a just result.
CHRISTOPHER A. HOLLAND

108. Garcia, 95 N.M. at 394, 622 P.2d at 702.
109. See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual
Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REv. 257, 284 (1991).
110. Cf. Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015, 1027 (Kan. 1976) (governmental immunity
is necessary because knowledge of government's vast resources encourages lawsuits).
111. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 270.
112. See David H. Hines, Note, Municipal Liability for Exemplary Damages, 15 CLEv.-M.A. L.
REV. 304, 312 (1966).
113. See supra note 59.
114. See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.

